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State Defense Forces and
Homeland Security
ARTHUR N. TULAK, ROBERT W. KRAFT,
and DON SILBAUGH

A

s US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) assumes responsibility within the Department of Defense for the homeland security and homeland
defense missions, it does so with few assigned forces. While the “Forces For”
apportionment to NORTHCOM is still being finalized, they will in any case
be meager in comparison to the scope of the task and the assigned area of responsibility. The paucity of forces available to NORTHCOM will require
more economical approaches to force-building for contingency operations in
support of homeland security missions. While the National Guard is ideally
positioned and suited for homeland security, it may not always be available in
adequate numbers if called to active federal duty in support of military operations overseas. In addition to the forces the National Guard may provide,
State Defense Forces1—military forces created, funded, and controlled solely
by the individual states, and already integrated into the emergency management operations of more than 20 states—are a potential force-provider for
homeland security operations.
NORTHCOM finds itself in a position familiar to the other regional
combatant commands in that it must interact with the numerous sovereign nations in its area of responsibility and develop appropriate Theater Security
Cooperation Plans (TSCP). The NORTHCOM area of responsibility encompasses Mexico, Canada, the Caribbean nations, and the European possessions
in the Caribbean. NORTHCOM also has responsibility for the territories of
Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, and for the 49 US states on the North
American continent. In this respect, the individual states are somewhat like
the sovereign nations, in that each state or territorial government controls certain military forces and other pertinent manpower resources within its boundaries.2 Just as NORTHCOM must develop a TSCP for the sovereign nations in
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its area of responsibility, so must it develop security cooperation plans for
homeland security contingency operations with each of the US states and territories in its area.
Friendly forces available to NORTHCOM to conduct its homeland
security mission—principally the National Guard elements—largely belong
to the state governors, with the military components under the control of the
state’s Adjutant General (AG).3 In 28 states, the AGs are also the directors of
the state’s emergency management agency or directorate, with control over
all emergency management components, both civilian and military.4 Within
the military departments of 23 states and the Territory of Puerto Rico are the
additional State Defense Forces (SDFs), which, like the state or territorial National Guard, are under the command of the governor through the Adjutant
General. Thus SDFs constitute a third tier of military forces (the first two are
federal forces, both active and reserve, and the dual-status National Guard
forces, which may be either under federal or state control).
State Defense Forces, controlled and funded by the state or territory,
are composed of volunteers who are paid only when called to state active duty
by the governor. Nearly half of the governors have standing SDFs, while all
the remaining states have the authority to raise such forces. It is therefore important for the NORTHCOM staff to understand State Defense Force capabilities and limitations, and to keep in mind appropriate roles and missions for
these forces as they work through the state AGs to develop contingency plans
for the next terrorist attack or disaster. According to the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, chaired by former Senators Gary
Hart and Warren Rudman, such an attack is most likely to occur when the
United States is involved in a conflict overseas, in which the National Guard
units of a state may be employed, making the potential contributions of the
State Defense Forces all the more significant.5
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State Defense Forces include both land and naval elements and are
state-controlled military forces that may not be called to federal service. Five
states—Alaska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin—have as part
of their state military forces a State Naval Militia, similarly administered by
their State Military Department.6 SDFs vary in size, composition, assigned
missions, and capabilities, but all share a responsibility to provide the state
with capabilities to respond to disasters, both natural and man-made, including terrorist attacks or subversive acts.7 SDFs can enhance homeland security
effectiveness and should therefore be integrated into NORTHCOM’s planning and preparation for homeland security operations.
Homeland security may be generally classified as preventive measures to deter attacks against the nation, and consequence and crisis management to deal with the aftermath of a terrorist or subversive attack.8 SDFs can
play an important role in enhancing the ability of the state through planning,
coordination, and rehearsals during times of normalcy in order to bring effective organizations and their capabilities to bear in times of crisis.

Relying on States and Localities for Initial Response
The national homeland security strategy assigns to the states and localities the “primary responsibility for funding, preparing, and operating the
emergency services in the event of a terrorist attack.”9 In the wake of the 11
September 2001 attacks, General William F. Kernan, then Commander of Joint
Forces Command, outlined the role of the military in homeland security and
proposed an order of response to domestic emergencies “that starts with the
first-responders, then the National Guard, and finally the reserves and active
components.”10 Unfortunately, the first-responder civilian forces under gubernatorial control are largely nonstandard from state to state, employ varying
procedures, are organized according to the preferences of the local and state
governments, and in most cases cannot communicate effectively intrastate, let
alone interstate.11 As the Hart-Rudman report notes, for example, “With few
exceptions, first-responder commanders do not have access to secure radios,
telephones, or video conferencing capabilities that can support communications with county, state, and federal emergency preparedness officials or National Guard leaders.”12
The variances of local and state first-responder organizational structures, procedures, communications architectures, and interoperability levels
across the nation will impose organizational limitations on NORTHCOM
planners as they develop contingency plans for military support. Such variances will require the identification of technological and procedural bridges
and capabilities within each state and territory that will enable command,
control, and communications, and which will permit some degree of stan134
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“Nearly half of the governors have standing
SDFs, while all the remaining states have
the authority to raise such forces.”

dardization in NORTHCOM plans for contingency support. The scale of
planning required of NORTHCOM is significant considering that before the
terrorist strikes on 9/11, only four states had contingency plans in place to respond to a significant terrorist attack.13
SDFs and the National Guard comprise the state military forces
available to the governor in this order of response, following the municipal
and county first-responders to the scene of an attack or disaster. SDFs represent a significant potential at the state level for providing trained personnel
who can easily integrate with active and reserve component military forces in
times of crisis, particularly since they share a similar culture, rank structure,
organization, and regulatory procedures.14 Since SDFs are not required to
train for a combat role to support the Army or Navy, they can focus exclusively on homeland security tasks in support of their state or territorial governor—an option not available to the Air and Army National Guard forces,
which must train for their combat roles in the event they are called into service
for the nation. The law authorizing the states and any territory, as well as
Washington, D.C., to form and maintain state military forces (Title 32, US
Code, section 109[c]), specifies that such forces “may not be called, ordered,
or drafted into the armed forces,”15 and as such remain under state or territorial control.
With the significant reduction in forces in the active components
since the end of the Cold War, the nation is now markedly more reliant on reserve component forces to conduct operations abroad in fulfilling its foreign
policy. Indeed, the increased reliance on reserve and National Guard forces
dates back to the end of the Vietnam War, but has become more pronounced in
the past decade. The National Guard is unique among these reserve component forces in that it may be considered a dual-apportioned force, that is, a
force included in more than one combatant command, as these units have both
state and federal missions. National Guard units are included in the war plans
of every combatant command. Furthermore, National Guard units have been
activated and deployed intact, up to the division level, to conduct peacekeepWinter 2003-04
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ing operations as part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia16 and the
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai.
When the United States has to fight a major theater war, the reserve
components have to be called up in substantial numbers just to fill the force
requirements for that theater and to ensure preparedness to deal with a possible second front. That leaves the state governors with fewer options to deal
with the consequence management aspects of natural disasters and terrorist
attacks, and to provide the required response to increased levels of readiness
necessitated by a change in the National Alert System. Additionally, the recent experience of state governments with reserve component mobilization
shows that it significantly depletes the ranks of first-responders, since police,
firefighters, and emergency service personnel are often members of the reserve forces.17 Recognizing these challenges, the Advisory Panel to Assess
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction, chaired by James Gilmore, recommended to the Secretary of
Defense that NORTHCOM develop “plans across the full spectrum of potential activities to provide military support to civil authorities, including
circumstances when other national assets are fully engaged or otherwise
unable to respond, or when the mission requires additional or different military support.”18
This change in the paradigm of how the nation has viewed its internal
security situation militarily has resulted in a dramatic change of focus for the
Department of Defense, which is studying intently the question of how to provide support to civil authorities to enhance their homeland security posture and
capabilities while fighting the global war on terror abroad in multiple theaters
of operations. This shift has also resulted in a change of mission for the State
Defense Forces, which are now focusing more than ever on how to support the
state to protect its citizens from threats to the homeland such as terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction. Given the dual-apportioned character of the National Guard, some see the State Defense Forces as the ultimate guarantor to the
states and territories to handle state-specific missions in the event the National
Guard is federalized.19

Role of the Militia in Homeland Security
As President Bush has pointed out, “The National Guard and reservists will be more involved in homeland security, confronting acts of terror
and the disorder our enemies may try to create.”20 Recognition of the increased role of the militia—the National Guard and State Defense Forces—in
homeland security was also clear in the reports of two advisory panels of
experts convened to review preparations for homeland security, the HartRudman Commission and the Gilmore Panel, both of which recommended
136
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that the National Guard take on homeland security as its primary mission and
be reorganized, trained, and equipped for such tasks. The Gilmore Panel recommended further that certain National Guard units be designated, trained,
and equipped for homeland security “as their exclusive missions.”21 Two
private associations, the National Guard Association of the United States
(NGAUS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), both
oppose this idea. The NGAUS argues that while National Guard units could
perform homeland security roles, their primary purpose is to remain interoperable with the Army in order to be employed in regional contingencies,
and their training and organization should reflect that purpose.22 State Defense Forces, on the other hand, have no combat mission and may focus exclusively on homeland security.
Both the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Gilmore Panel argued
that homeland security demands specialized training and recommended that
the Secretary of Defense require units to undergo such training. Both panels
noted that while the National Guard will comprise the bulk of forces provided
to NORTHCOM in the event of a crisis, those forces “will most likely be
trained for warfighting, not necessarily for homeland defense or civil support
missions.”23
State Defense Forces, on the other hand, encourage specialization in
emergency management training for units and leaders. Many SDF personnel
are certified for emergency management and planning through courses offered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and its Emergency Management Institute.24 The SDFs place great importance on this
specialized skill set, and certification in emergency management training is
often a prerequisite for duty in the state Emergency Operations Center and for
promotion. The State Guard Association of the United States (SGAUS) offers
a Military Emergency Management Specialist badge to SDF personnel who
have completed this training, providing a national standard of competence.25
Having such highly specialized and qualified personnel available to serve in
the state Emergency Operations Center provides a vital procedural bridge between the military forces, local first-responders, and state and federal agencies responding to the crisis, as they can operate effectively in both military
and civilian environments.
In the event of a crisis or terrorist attack, states and localities will respond with their available military and civilian assets in accordance with
their emergency management plans. When circumstances pose military requirements that exceed the capabilities of the National Guard and State
Defense Forces, the governor may appeal for federal assistance. The introduction of federal military forces does not require the federalization of the
National Guard, unless the task is specifically a part of homeland defense, in
Winter 2003-04
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“The recent experience of state governments with
reserve component mobilization shows that it
significantly depletes the ranks of first-responders.”

which case these state military forces would be integrated into the military
chain of command under Title 10 of US Code to defend against aggression.
State Defense Forces, on the other hand, “may not be controlled or commanded by federal authorities, and missions are identified only by appropriate state officials, [i.e.] the State Adjutant General . . . [who] is not considered
a federal authority.”26 The lead federal agencies for crisis management and
consequence management are the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
FEMA, respectively.27 NORTHCOM will likely provide support to these
lead federal civilian agencies through Joint Force Headquarters – Homeland
Security (JFHQ HLS) or its subordinate Joint Task Force – Civil Support
(JTF-CS).28
If the emergency prompting the employment of state military forces
is declared a disaster at the federal level, then state National Guard soldiers
may transition from a state active duty status to a Title 32 status, which is federally funded, nonfederal duty status, to perform state duty. State Defense
Forces would remain in state active duty status in any case. Only in the case of
a declaration of martial law or in the execution of homeland defense operations against an aggressor would State Defense Forces conceivably be under
the direct control of the federal military.29
As previously noted, the state Adjutant General is frequently the senior official in the state responsible for emergency management and will run
the state Emergency Operations Center during a crisis, after a natural disaster,
or in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. In those states where the AG is not the
director of the state emergency management agency or directorate, he is often
the governor’s primary adviser for military emergency response.30 Since the
AGs and the state military headquarters (State Area Command, or STARC)
do not mobilize for war, they should be viewed as available for the homeland
security mission.31 At the state level, the AGs have responsibility for consequence management preparations as part of the state’s emergency response
plan, and are responsible for “supporting community readiness exercises designed to test local planning and preparation.”32
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During a crisis in which state military forces are employed, the AGs
will command and control state military forces, and conduct operations
through the STARC headquarters. Below the STARC are the unit armories
and subordinate brigade headquarters distributed throughout the state or territory through which the Adjutant General extends his command and control
to assigned National Guard and State Defense Force units. This ready-made
command and control system in the STARC and supporting facilities available to the Adjutant General, as well as the unique federal/state status of the
National Guard and the state status of the State Defense Forces, uniquely
qualifies this structure to serve as NORTHCOM’s primary force provider of
military support to local first-responders and civilian authorities.33
State military forces under the control of the Adjutant General may
assist neighboring states in responding to natural disasters and homeland security mission where bilateral agreements exist.34 This is made possible
through the national standardization of tactics, techniques, and procedures,
as well as organizational culture, rank structure, and unit organization, all of
which greatly facilitate effective integration with federal military units, as
well as with state forces in other states.35 The procedures, culture, and training
of National Guard soldiers and units, to which the SDFs adhere, are common
across the nation, and provide a framework for standardized models of command and control for NORTHCOM contingency planning at the state level.36
Both the newly created Department of Homeland Security and NORTHCOM
can work through the AGs to coordinate state contingency planning for
homeland security missions employing state military forces.
Procedures for federal command and control of state military forces
have evolved through such civil support operations as the support for the
Olympic games in 1996 and 2002. In providing support to the 1996 Olympic
games, the US Army (then designated as the DOD executive agent) used the
First US Army as the controlling headquarters under which it formed a Response Task Force (RTF) headquarters. The RTF headquarters, which directed all military support operations, was “designed specifically to work
with federal, state, and local civilian officials supporting the event.”37 In this
operation, the Army operated with parallel chains of command for federal
and state military forces.38
For the 2002 Olympic games in Salt Lake City, DOD formed the
Combined Joint Task Force – Olympics (CJTF-O). To facilitate tactical direction of state military forces, a series of memorandums of agreement was completed between the various state AGs, CJTF-O, US Joint Forces Command,
and the National Guard Bureau, which gave the CJTF-O Commander “tasking authority” over the Title 32 forces in his area of operations.39 The memorandums of agreement developed with the AGs of 11 states for CJTF-O
Winter 2003-04
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“SDFs represent a valuable additional
component for homeland security and homeland
defense contingency planning and operations.”

provide a solid model for homeland security contingency planning. NORTHCOM’s JFHQ-HLS could employ this approach for using state military
forces on state status under the tactical direction of a Title 10 Joint Task Force
commander.40 Using this model would mean that NORTHCOM’s JFHQHLS would not “command” the state’s National Guard forces called to active
duty by the governor, nor its SDFs. Rather, the result would be a combined organization achieving unity of effort via tasking authority through the state
Adjutant General.

Expanding the Role of State Defense Forces
SDFs participate in the planning and preparation for state responses
to natural disasters and terrorist attacks, and they participate in joint and interagency exercises to be ready for such contingencies. Tasks supporting
homeland security constitute the raison d’être for SDFs and drive the development of their mission-essential task list. Through their AGs, governors set
State Defense Force missions and provide the resources needed to enable
them to accomplish those missions.
The primary contributions SDFs offer to NORTHCOM lie in providing personnel specialized in emergency management to support contingency
planning, preparation, and coordination, and to operate the command, control, and communications (C3) facilities set up in response to crises. SDF personnel man duty stations in the state Emergency Operations Centers and state
Joint Operations Centers, and SDFs are capable of providing C3 facilities and
headquarters in the field. Most SDFs provide manning at fixed C3 facilities,
but some also have the ability to man mobile command posts.
Probably the ultimate example of the contributions in the arena of
mobile C3 capabilities that SDFs can offer is found in the South Carolina
State Guard, which operates the South Carolina Emergency Communications
Vehicle (ECV). The ECV is a state-of-the-art vehicle which provides the
technological bridges and communications—including satellite communications—to link together the various C3 systems used by the local firstresponder forces, state and federal emergency management agencies, and the
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military command post. The ECV provides short-term emergency telephone
and radio dispatch capability in a forward disaster area.
SDFs have a long history of service to their states, including many
recent examples relevant to today’s threat conditions.41 Over the past two decades, SDFs have been called to state active duty in support of several environmental disasters and terrorist attacks, including the following: the Exxon
Valdez oil spill recovery operation in 1989 (Alaska Naval Militia); tornados
in Tennessee in 1993 (Tennessee State Guard); the TWA Flight 800 crash into
New York Harbor in 1996 (New York Guard and Naval Militia); winter
storms that same year (New York Guard, Virginia State Defense Force, Oregon State Defense Force, and Maryland Defense Force); the 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center (New York Guard, Naval Militia, and New
Jersey Naval Militia);42 and as part of Operation Noble Eagle, the coastal patrol and maritime homeland security operation around the United States, including critical infrastructure protection of the Alaskan oil pipeline (Alaska
State Defense Force).43
A superb example of how state military forces are already integrated
into the consequence management aspects of homeland security in states
where they serve can be seen in the actions of the New Jersey Naval Militia in
response to the 2001 World Trade Center attack. After the terrorists struck,
the New Jersey Naval Militia’s Disaster Medical Assistance Team and Chaplain Corps were both mobilized at Staten Island, New York, to assist survivors
and rescue workers in support of Task Force Respect, while other Naval
Guardsman transported some of the evidence collected from Ground Zero to
Manhattan’s Chelsea Pier and Staten Island.44 New Jersey Naval Militia also
were activated to participate in Operation Noble Eagle, with the Naval
Guardsmen taking on a multitude of tasks. They provided 24-hour staffing for
the New Jersey National Guard’s Joint Operations Center at Fort Dix, New
Jersey; provided boat crews to support the rescue and recovery efforts in New
York City with ferry services across the Hudson River; provided the waterborne security which allowed for the opening of the George Washington
Bridge; relieved State Marine Police crews; and provided waterborne security for New Jersey’s nuclear power plants. They also augmented the US
Navy’s waterborne security forces at US Naval Weapons Station Earle, where
boats crewed by Naval Militia sailors performed picket boat duty to patrol the
security zone, helping to protect US Navy and Coast Guard ships while munitions were being loaded.45
Our focus thus far has been on the land and naval components of
State Defense Forces. Obviously, to conduct homeland security operations, a
governor may also call to state duty the Air National Guard with its wide
range of transport, reconnaissance, and fighter capabilities. However, like
Winter 2003-04
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their land component counterparts, units of the various state Air National
Guards are earmarked for combat operations and are included in the war plans
for the regional combatant commands. Consequently they may not be available to the states when needed. Alaska, New York, Texas, and Virginia have
SDFs with air components,46 but there are other aerial forces NORTHCOM
can call upon for homeland security operations in the event that the Air National Guard forces are not available in times of crisis, and where the SDF
lacks its own aviation component. NORTHCOM also can draw upon the resources of the Civil Air Patrol and, in some cases, the aviation elements of the
US Coast Guard Auxiliary.
While not an organ of any state, the Civil Air Patrol, the congressionally designated civilian auxiliary to the US Air Force, is already integrated into state emergency management operations in each of the 50 states,
Washington, D.C., and the territories of the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.
The Civil Air Patrol “through its emergency services program, maintains
the capability to meet requests of the Air Force and assist federal, state, and
local agencies . . . [with] aircraft, vehicles, communications equipment, and
a force of trained volunteers for response to natural and man-made disasters
or national emergencies.”47 Among the missions the Civil Air Patrol can perform in support of homeland security is the task to “man designated positions at state and local communications and emergency operations centers.”48
This means that NORTHCOM will likely encounter Civil Air Patrol personnel at the various state Emergency Operations Centers during crisis response
operations. Accordingly, the Civil Air Patrol and its capabilities should be
considered as one of the aviation components available to NORTHCOM
as it works with states to develop contingency plans for homeland security
contingencies.

Conclusion
State Defense Forces are already integrated at the state level in the
emergency management and consequence management plans of the several
states and territories that maintain such forces. Given the dual-apportioned
character of the National Guard to fulfill both its federal mission in support of
the National Military Strategy and its state missions of civil support and disaster assistance, SDFs represent a valuable additional component for homeland security and homeland defense contingency planning and operations.
State Defense Forces can provide a pool of specially trained personnel to
assist in homeland security planning and command and control. State Defense Forces can provide key technological and procedural bridges to link
NORTHCOM to local first-responders and state and federal agencies during
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operations. As NORTHCOM continues to develop its operating picture and
establish contacts and working arrangements with the State Area Commands
and AGs, it will find itself working with State Defense Force personnel. Since
NORTHCOM will be looking to the states and territories for first-responders
and initial forces, it is important that its planning staff consider State Defense
Forces and integrate them into contingency planning for regional and state responses for homeland security. NORTHCOM should ensure that future contingency planning efforts for homeland security operations fully incorporate
the valuable capabilities that State Defense Forces can provide.
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